University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 1 Fall 1983

Article 12

1983

Casenotes: Civil Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —
Punitive Damages Are Available under Section
1983 When the Defendant's Conduct Involves
Reckless or Callous Indifference of the Plaintiff 's
Federally Protected Rights. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.
Ct. 1625 (1983)
Dale E. Cantone
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cantone, Dale E. (1983) "Casenotes: Civil Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Punitive Damages Are Available under Section 1983 When
the Defendant's Conduct Involves Reckless or Callous Indifference of the Plaintiff 's Federally Protected Rights. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.
Ct. 1625 (1983)," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol13/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

CIVIL RIGHTS - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE
AVAILABLE UNDER SECTION 1983 WHEN THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT INVOLVES RECKLESS OR CALLOUS INFEDERALLY
THE
PLAINTIFF'S
DIFFERENCE OF
PROTECTED RIGHTS. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).
An inmate in a Missouri reformatory for youthful first offenders
was beaten, harassed, and sexually assaulted by his two cellmates.I
The inmate, who had voluntarily placed himself in protective custody
because of prior incidents of violence against him, alleged that reformatory officials knew or should have known that an assault against him
was likely.2 The inmate brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 against a
guard and other corrections officials, alleging that his eighth amendment rights had been violated4 by his placement in a cell with two other
inmates from the general reformatory population. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict, finding the guard liable5 and awarding the inmate $25,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in
punitive damages.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.7 In a close decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit.' The Court, writing through Justice Brennan, held that
1. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1983).
2. Id The inmate, Wade, had previously placed himself in a special treatment unit
which housed inmates who were especially susceptible to being physically abused
by other inmates. At the time of the assault, Wade had been transferred out of
protective custody and reassigned to another unit. A corrections official placed
Wade in a cell with another inmate from the general reformatory population.
When the guard, Smith, came on duty, he placed a third inmate, who had a history of being involved in fights, in Wade's cell. The two inmates subsequently
assaulted Wade. Smith made no effort to ascertain whether another cell was
available in which to house Wade. In addition, the guard was aware that another
inmate had recently been beaten to death by his cellmates in the same dormitory
while Smith was on duty. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1981),
afl'd sub noma. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
4. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1983). The eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1628 (1983). Of the five defendants in this case,
Smith was the only one found liable. ld
6. Id The trial court charged the jury that it could award punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages, "ifthe conduct of one or more of the defendants is
shown to be a reckless or callousdisregardof or indiflerence to, the rights or safety
of others ...." Id. (emphasis supplied by Supreme Court).
7. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'dsub nom. Smith v. Wade,
103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).
8. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983) (5-4 decision).
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punitive damages are available under section 1983 when the defendant's conduct involves a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintifts
federally protected rights, as well as when the defendant's conduct involves an evil motive or intent. 9
Section 1983 is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' ° The
decisional law regarding section 1983 was relatively sparse until the
1960's." Until that time, section 1983 was used primarily as a vehicle
to secure voting rights for blacks. 2 In 1961, the Supreme Court effectively broadened the scope of section 198313 by its decision in Monroe
v. Pape.'4 Monroe involved a suit against thirteen Chicago police officers who allegedly violated the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment
rights. The defendants argued that they were not liable under section
1983 because their acts were illegal under state law and, therefore, they
did not fit within the section 1983 requirement that state officials act
under color of state law.' 5 The Court disagreed that holding the officers liable under section 1983 would produce the undesirable result of
duplicating in federal law what was already an offense under state
law. 6 The Mo.vroe Court concluded that the federal remedy was supplemental to the state remedy and that state laws providing redress for
violations of constitutional rights by state officials would not preclude a
section 1983 claim.' 7 The Court's broad reading of section 1983 precipitated a substantial increase in the volume of federal civil rights
litigation. 8
Section 1983 provides a means of redress when state officials have
violated an individual's civil rights. The Act itself does not indicate,
however, the appropriate measure of recovery under section 1983.19
The Monroe decision is noteworthy in this context because it implies in
dictum that damages under section 1983 should be awarded with refer9. Id. The Court further held that this reckless indifference standard applies even
when the underlying standard of liability for compensatory damages is also one of
recklessness. Id.
10. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1979)); see supra note 3.
11. See Note, DamageA wardsfor ConstitutionalTorts. A ReconsiderationAfter Carey
v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966, 974 (1980).
12. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 277, 282-83 (1965). The Act, originally referred to as the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, was used to redress violations of the voting rights of blacks by
means of civil actions against election officials. Id ; see Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915).
13. McClellan & Northcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violation of Constitutional
Rights, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 409, 409-10 (1980).
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 184 (1961); see supra note 3.
16. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
17. Id.
18. Shapo, supra note 12, at 278.
19. See supra note 3.
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ence to the common law of torts.2 ° Generally, under the common law
of torts, the objective in awarding damages is to compensate the victim
for consequential injuries.2'
The Supreme Court, in Carey v. Pvhus,2 2 expressly adopted the
Monroe dictum that damages under section 1983 should be awarded
according to traditional tort principles. In Carey, several elementary
and high school students were suspended from classes without being
afforded any type of hearing. The students filed suit under section
1983, seeking redress from an alleged violation of their right to procedural due process.2 3 In holding for the students, the Carey Court stated
that compensation for injuries should be the cardinal principle by
which to award section 1983 damages. 24 The Court noted that the
starting point for damage inquiries under section 1983 is provided by
reference to the common law tort principle that damages are awarded
as compensation for injuries suffered. 25 Therefore, the Court refused to
presume damages for violations of constitutional rights, holding that,
under the facts of Carey, only a nominal award not to exceed one dollar could be granted, absent a showing of actual injury. 26 The Carey
decision did not address the issue of whether punitive damages could
be awarded in a section 1983 action, although the Court stated that it
was not foreclosing the possibility that punitive damages could be
awarded in a proper case under section 1983.27 Since the Court presumed that actual malice was the standard for awarding punitive damages under section 1983, it stated that punitive damages were improper
in Carey because of the absence of actual malice.28
In 1980, in Carlson v. Green, 29 the Court indicated for the first time
that punitive damages were available under section 1983. In Carlson,
the estate of a deceased federal prisoner sued federal prison officials for
violations of the deceased's constitutional rights and sought both com20. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK

OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971); see
Seavy, Principles of Tort, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 72 (1942); cf. Nahmod, Section
1983 and the Backgroundof Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 9-10 (1974); Note, supra
note 11, at 966-67.
22. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
23. Id at 249-50.
24. Id at 254-55 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299

(1956)).
25. Carey, 435 U.S. at 258. The Court recognized that the common law of torts might
not provide the complete solution to the damage issue under section 1983. In
some cases, the constitutional right may have no analogue at common law. As a
result, a court may have to adapt common law rules of damages to the constitutional right at issue to fulfill the purposes of section 1983. Id at 258-59.
26. Id at 267. Generally, nominal damages are awarded when a person has suffered
a wrong, but no actual injury can be proven. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 20 (1935).
27. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978).
28. Id
29. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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pensatory and punitive damages.3" Although Carlson was a Bivenstype suit 3' brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials, this principle is equally applicable to suits brought under section
1983 against state officials.32 The Carlson Court noted that section
1983 serves the same compensatory and deterrence purposes as the Bivens remedy. 33 The Court held that a Bivens remedy was available although an alternative remedy existed under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). 34 The opinion in Carlson further recognized that the Bivens remedy was available in addition to the FTCA remedy because the
former is a more effective deterrent of unconstitutional behavior than
the latter.3" Unlike the FTCA remedy, punitive damages are available
under Bivens, and a Bivens suit is brought against the official rather
than the government. 36 In addition, the Court went so far as to cite
Carey v. Piohus for the proposition that punitive damages are available
in a proper section 1983 action.3 7
In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,38 the Supreme Court
again acknowledged that punitive damages might be awarded in a
proper section 1983 action. 39 In Newport, a concert promoter and concert promotion organization sued the city of Newport and several of its
officials, alleging that the cancellation of a license to present musical
concerts violated the promoters' constitutional rights.4" After finding
for the promoters, the Newport Court considered whether punitive
damages could be awarded as a remedy against the municipality. The
Court concluded that when the original version of section 1983 was
enacted, municipal corporations were immune from punitive damages
30. Id at 16.
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), recognized a cause of
action implicit in the Constitution. Although analogous to a section 1983 action, a
Bivens action is brought against federal, rather than state, officials. See Love,
Damages. A Remedy for the Violation of ConstitutionalRights, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
1242, 1242 (1979).
32. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (granting federal employees
qualified immunity in a Bivens-type suit based on section 1983 law); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978) (relying on a Bivens-type suit to interpret a section 1983 action; see also Note, supra note 11, at 973 (section 1983 law applies
with equal force to Bivens-type suits).
33. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 n.6 (1980).
34. Id at 23. The FTCA is codified throughout the United States Code. E.g., 28
U.S.C, §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
35. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22 (dictum) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978)). The
Court erred in concluding that Carey stood for the proposition that punitive damages are available under section 1983. The Court in Carey specifically declined to
approve or disapprove any of the cases that have awarded punitive damages in
section 1983 actions. Id at 257 n.l; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 47
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
39. Id at 267-68 (dictum).
40. Id at 252. The promoters alleged a violation of their constitutional right to due
process and freedom of expression. Id.
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under the common law.4 Finding that the deterrence rationale behind
section 1983 did not warrant a departure from the common law rule,
the Newport Court held that the city could not be held liable for an
award of punitive damages.4 2 The Court reasoned that deterrence, the
primary purpose of section 1983, would not be achieved by subjecting a
municipality to punitive damages, since taxpayers would ultimately
bear the cost of that award, rather than the offending public official.4 3
Furthermore, deterrence is achieved more effectively by assessing punitive damages against the offending public official, based on his personal
financial resources." The Newport Court thus implicitly recognized
that punitive damages may be awarded under section 1983.
Although it had generally been established by lower court decisions that punitive damages could be awarded in a section 1983 action,45 the lower courts disagreed as to the applicable standard in
determining such an award.4 6 While language used by the Supreme
Court in Carey, Carlson, and Newport indicated that some sort of malicious intent was necessary, 47 a majority of lower federal courts applied
a reckless disregard standard in determining when punitive damages
could be imposed under section 1983.48 The reckless disregard test was
delineated by Justice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting opinion
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

ld at 259-60.
Id at 268.
Id at 268-69.
Id at 269. Other purposes of punitive damages include punishing the defendant,
preserving the peace, inducing private law enforcement, compensating victims for
otherwise incompensable losses, and paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Ellis,
Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1
(1982).
Eg., Cook v. Miami, 464 F. Supp. 737, 739 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Bradley v. School
Board of Richmond, 324 F. Supp. 401,402 (E.D. Va. 1971); see Annot., 14 A.L.R.
FED. 608, 616 (1973); Note, Punitive Damages in Constitutional Tort Actions, 57
NOTRE DAME LAW. 530, 534 (1982); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980).
See, e.g., Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiff may
recover punitive damages under section 1983 when defendant has acted in reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights); accord Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 243
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979); O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp.
1359, 1375 (D. Md. 1981); Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172, 186 (S.D. Tex.
1974). But see Hannah v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
may recover punitive damages under section 1983 when defendant acted with malicious intention to deprive plaintiff of his rights); accord O'Connor v. Several
Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1981); Coleman v. Siedel, 533 F. Supp. 593, 599 (D. Conn. 1980).
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (punitive damages are intended "to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional
or malicious"); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n.9 (1980) ("after Carey punitive
damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions
where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove
compensable injury"); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n. 11 (1978) (no punitive
damages awarded because "petitioners did not act with a malicious intention to
deprive respondents of their rights").
See supra note 46.
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in Adickes v. Kress & Co.49 Justice Brennan indicated that punitive
damages could be recovered in a section 1983 action when a defendant
acted with either actual knowledge that he was violating another's constitutional rights or with reckless disregard of those rights.5 °
In Smith v. Wade, 5 the Supreme Court held that punitive damages are available under section 1983 when a defendant's conduct is
shown to be prompted by an evil motive or intent, or when his conduct
involves a reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others. 52 To support this finding, the Court applied the traditional analysis of section 1983 cases that was first set forth in Carey v.
Piphus. Under this analysis, a court refers to the common law of torts
with such modifications or adaptations as might be necessary to effectu53
ate the purpose and policy of the statute.
The majority found that the prevailing standard used in the nineteenth century for awarding punitive damages in a tort case required
something less than a showing of ill will, spite, or malice.54 The Smith
Court, however, recognized that significant variations existed among
jurisdictions in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the standard
to be applied in awarding punitive damages.5 5 This disagreement
among the jurisdictions concerned whether malicious intent was required to impose punitive damages, and was attributable in part to the
ambiguity surrounding the definition of malice. 56 The majority viewed
this disagreement as simply being over the degree of recklessness that
had to be established before an award of punitive damages could be
made. 57 The Court then buttressed its position with an exhaustive survey of punitive damage awards in tort cases occurring before and
shortly after 1871 to demonstrate that Congress intended that the reckless disregard standard apply in actions brought under the Civil Rights
Act.58 Finally, the Court noted that punitive damages are awarded in
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.
58.

398 U.S. 144, 232-33 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
Id. at 1640.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978); see supra note 25.
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1631-32 (1983); see, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B.R.
Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858) (reckless disregard standard); Barry
v. Edwards, 116 U.S. 550 (1886) (same); accord Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v.
Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875).
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1983).
Id In some instances, "malice" meant actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure. In
tort law, however, it was sometimes used to mean "implied malice," which was
presumed whenever a tort resulted from a voluntary act. "Malice" had additional
meanings as well, including that form of malice when the defendant acted in reckless indifference to another's rights. Id at n.8.
Id at 1632.
Id. at 1632-36. Under a rule of statutory construction commonly used by the
Court in interpreting section 1983, if Congress is silent on an issue, a presumption
arises that Congress intended to adopt the common law existing at the time of
enactment. Id at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing City of Newport v. Fact
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modem tort actions upon a finding of reckless disregard of the rights of
others.5 9
The Court rejected the argument that policy considerations required a departure from the common law rule.6" The guard in Smith
argued that an actual malicious intent standard was preferable to the
reckless disregard standard. He asserted that the reckless disregard
standard was too vague and uncertain to deter public officials from acting unlawfully since it would be unclear what conduct would subject
them to the imposition of punitive damages. 6 1 The majority, however,
concluded that a reckless disregard standard was not too vague because
it is applied without difficulty in ordinary tort cases and in first amendment defamation cases. 6 2 Because punitive damages are a discretionary award, the Court summarily rejected the contention that the
standard for punitive damages should always be higher than the standard for compensatory damages.6 3
The Smith Court used the analysis established in Carey v. Pophus
that an award of damages under section 1983 should be made with
This method of analysis
reference to common law tort principles.'
proved less than satisfactory in Smith due to the considerable confusion that existed in tort law in 1871 regarding the computation of punitive damages. 65 The confusion over whether malicious intent or
recklessness was required at common law to award punitive damages is
evidenced by Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Smith. 66 Although Justice Rehnquist surveyed the same body of tort common law
as the majority, he concluded that a showing of malice was required to
award punitive damages.67 Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissenting
opinion," concluded that when, as in Smith, a significant split of au-

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255
(1978)).
Id at 1635. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1636 (1983).
Id at 1636-37.
Id at 1637. On the standard of punitive damages applied in tort law, see supra
text accompanying note 57; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
349-50 (1974) (punitive damages in defamation cases under the first amendment
are awarded on the showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth).
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1638-39 (1983).
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes
22-25.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id Justice Rehnquist would require an actual malicious intent standard for punitive damages under section 1983. In addition to finding that malice was the standard for punitive damages at common law, Justice Rehnquist stated that the
policies behind section 1983 support the adoption of the actual malice standard.
Id at 1656-58.
Id at 1658-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in that part of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent which stated that the policies and purposes behind
section 1983 dictate the adoption of a malicious intent standard for awarding pu-
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thority existed at the time of enactment, it is unilluminating to resort to
common law to determine congressional intent regarding the correct
standard to be applied in awarding punitive damages in section 1983
actions. She further noted that this conclusion is particularly compelling since the language used by the courts in that period was vague and
contradictory.6 9
The Carey analysis that was applied in Smith v. Wade has been
criticized generally for not distinguishing between ordinary tort cases
and constitutional tort cases.7 ° Under Carey, compensatory damages
for a deprivation of constitutional rights was measured in the same way
as damages for a deprivation of ordinary rights; recovery was limited to
the amount of actual injury proven. Carey thus failed to recognize that
constitutional rights have an intrinsic value apart from the injuries to
persons or property that may accompany their violation.7 The better
approach is to recognize a distinction between ordinary torts and constitutional torts and to allow recovery for a deprivation of a constitutional right regardless of the actual injury suffered.
The Carey method of analysis was difficult to apply in Smith because tort common law was unsettled on the issue of how to compute
punitive damages. The result in Smith, however, is commendable, especially since Carey fails to compensate deprivations of constitutional
rights for other than actual injury. In many cases where no actual injury can be shown, punitive damages are the only substantial damage
award that can be made for a deprivation of a constitutional right.7 2
Because recklessness is much easier to prove than actual malice, the
Smith Court's adoption of the recklessness standard indicates a greater
concern for providing a means of redress for violations of constitutional rights under section 1983.
Dale E Cantone

69.
70.
71.
72.

nitive damages under section 1983. Justice O'Connor stated that awards of compensatory damages, coupled with attorney's fees under section 1988, already
provide adequate deterrence for violations of section 1983. Id.
Id at 1640.
McClellan & Northcross, supra note 13, at 465; see Note, supra note 11, at 967;
Note, supra note 45, at 542-43.
Note, supra note 11, at 978.
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n.9 (1980). In Carey, because the plaintiffs
could not prove actual damages, they were limited to a nominal damage award of
one dollar for deprivation of their procedural due process rights. Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978).

